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Abstract
Policies regarding the environmental behaviour of industry have changed drastically over
the last decades in most industrialised countries. Some features of these changes are the
move from regulations of the command and control type to more consensual or negotiated
types of regulation, such as voluntary agreements. This is accompanied by the shift from
direct regulation to regulation making use of indirect steering models, for example through
different actors in a policy network; and the change from end of pipe oriented policies
towards prevention oriented policies. Furthermore, in the Dutch environmental policy
system target groups have become an important focus of environmental policy making. It is
expected that through consensual approaches target groups are better able to cost
effectively progress towards more environment friendly behaviour.  This paper critically
evaluates these innovations in Dutch environmental policy. We assess the potential of these
policies for diffusing available technologies throughout industries and the potential for
inducing the kind of innovations deemed necessary for sustainable development.
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1. Introduction
Our understanding of environmental problems and of ways to address them has increased
in the last decades. However, while some of these environmental problems have become
increasingly evident and more pressing there are no ready-made solutions to these
problems. In the search for more effective and efficient environmental policies, approaches
have shifted from direct regulation with strict enforcement, to more flexible and consensual
approaches.  Much of these new developments are based on the premise that the transition
to sustainability requires a co-operative paradigm, with diverse stakeholders negotiating a
shared vision of the future and co-ordinating their resources in order to progress towards
sustainable development (Hartman et al, 1999). It also argued that these approaches are
more cost effective as target groups can time the development and introduction of new
technologies and are not confronted with short term standards which are likely to be
suboptimal in the long term (Ashford, 1996; Harrison, 1999). There is now growing
experience with voluntary agreements, for example with industrial branches, in which
private and public bodies agree on the extent to which environmental problems will be
tackled (e.g. through reduction targets for certain pollutants), its timing, and the ways in
which these goals are to be achieved (Glasbergen, 1998). In the Netherlands covenants
have been concluded between public and private parties in branches such as printing, metal
plating, chemicals and dairy industry since the beginning of the nineties. Targets have been
set through translation of overall targets in the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan
and the relative contribution to specific emissions by the respective branches1. While final
targets are set for 2010, several intermediary targets are set and progress is monitored
accordingly. Furthermore, studies are carried out to assess the possible gap with the final
                                                
1 Therefore these targets were predominantly set through a non consensual governance mode,
because reaching these targets was a condition for progressing towards sustainable
development. Industries could either accept the targets and the consensual approach in working
5targets if the branch will be using current available best technologies and to indicate the
necessary technological developments to bridge this possible gap.
Voluntary agreements are mainly used in the European Union. Within the EU the
Netherlands are leading with over 100 voluntary agreements in place (EEA, 1997). With
this paper we aim to critically evaluate these approaches. We assess both the potential of
voluntary agreements to stimulate diffusion of new technologies (diffusion potential) and
the to stimulate innovation (innovation potential) by drawing from own empirical work and
secondary sources. We will focus on a particular type of voluntary agreement, the so-called
target group covenants. These are comprehensive voluntary agreements closed with the
most polluting branches of industry, closed from 1993 on.
In section two, we start with some of the background factors inducing new policies of
dealing with environmental problems. These include increased understanding of the
complexity of environmental problems and the time horizon of strategies to deal with them
and the way various strategies can influence the dynamics of decision making in
companies. These approaches also make increasing use of third parties or intermediates in
order to influence the behaviour of the final target group, for example through so-called
policy networks (Koppenjan et al, 1993). We explore some of the theoretical underpinnings
of the newly developed strategies. Section three will then discuss the main developments in
both environmental policy and technology policy in the Netherlands, with a focus on the
role of voluntary agreements in recent policies. This is relevant because the consensual
approaches are part of larger policy systems, with various mechanisms in place to employ
the diffusion potential and innovation potential in target groups. This is followed by section
four where we try to identify the kind of progress induced by these new approaches. A final
section will draw some conclusions regarding the potential of these new approaches and
shortcomings specifically in the light of the demands of sustainable development.
2. From command and control to flexible approaches: six dimensions
There are several reasons why the traditional command and control approach in
environmental policy has lost its credibility. Strategies addressing environmental problems
through direct regulation were built on several assumptions. Firstly, it was assumed that
                                                                                                                                                   
towards them, or expect intensifying direct regulation in order to secure these long term targets.
6environmental problems are calculable and solvable. In the second place governments were
expected to be able to handle these environmental problems through legislative measures.
Overall there was a general confidence in prescribing technical solutions to the target
groups responsible for environmental problems. It became clear in the eighties that the
assumptions held in the seventies were not conform reality. It is recognised that existing
environmental problems are difficult to capture and size up, even with significant scientific
input, while new environmental problems keep on bubbling up, sometimes also through
new scientific insights. This means that there is uncertainty regarding the scale and size of
environmental problems and the depth and ways in which they are to be tackled. Moreover,
it is mostly accepted that many solutions are not of a short-term nature but of the medium
to longer term. In recent Dutch environmental policy documents time periods of 25 years or
more are commonly used. In the third place, it is recognised that the government is not the
only institution that should deal with environmental problems, but also contributions are
asked from, and in interaction with, businesses, consumers, NGOs and other sectors of
society.
The shortcomings of command and control approaches thus made clear that a new
approach in environmental policy was necessary to make progress towards sustainable
development. This does not imply the replacement of one approach by another, but the
development of more flexible approaches to be adapted to specific situations. The approach
of different target groups (e.g. various branches of industry, consumers, traffic, electricity
production), is for example dependent upon:
• specific characteristics of the target group;
• the situation in which the target group is operating;
• available options for more sustainable behaviour
Within this flexible mode of steering several dimensions can be discerned. The degree of
freedom of choice that environmental policies give to target groups is generally stressed as
one of the most important dimensions2, especially when policies are aimed at inducing
innovation (Ashford, 1993; Norberg-Bohm, 1999). A basic feature is that, compared to the
previous static type of regulation, it is much more of a dynamic nature. For example, in
                                                
2 Schrama and Van Lierop, 1999, in press, give an overview of research on the aspects of
different policy approaches.
7Dutch environmental policy several long-term targets are set (the 1989 NEPP 1 holds
targets for 2010) but the routes through which these targets are to be met are open for
discussion and negotiation (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1989). In this sense, these
approaches adopt a perspective of learning. At the onset of NEPP 1 aims were made clear,
with an expected certainty that the realisation of these aims would bring sustainable
development within our reach. It was uncertain, however, how these aims were to be
reached, and therefore target groups were given time and leeway to find out ways to reach
these targets. While diffusion of the current technological state of the art in specific
branches may therefore be insufficient to meet targets, the dynamics of decision-making
processes in companies and innovative outcomes is expected to move in a more
environment friendly direction.
A further dimension of a flexible approach is the consensual or co-operative nature of
policy making and implementation. Faced with the complexities of environmental
problems and the needed drastic behavioural changes of target groups in order to achieve
sustainable development, many authors have argued a co-operative paradigm is needed.
According to Jänicke (1992, 1997) consensual capacity is an institutional condition for
success in environmental policy. Collaboration is expected to have value-added as it
implies “a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can
constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own
limited vision of what is possible” (Gray 1989: 5). Collaboration can vary from simple
forms of communication between policy makers and target groups to ‘interactive policy
making’, which involves interaction on the preliminary stages of the policy process.
Reaching consensus is also an essential feature of the often-praised Dutch ‘polder-model’3.
The importance of consensus can be drawn from its role in:
•  increasing public support and acceptance of policy;
•  reducing the uncertainty of target groups regarding the purport of policies and its
consequences for them;
•  exchange of knowledge regarding underlying causes of environmental problems and the
                                                
3 The polder-model has historically evolved as a process of negotiations between employers
organisations, unions, and government agencies over labour issues (wages, conditions). This
model is increasingly used in environmental policy making through negotiations between target
groups (e.g. industries, energy producers), environmental NGOs and government agencies and
has been labelled the ‘green polder-model’.
8possibilities for more sustainable behaviour of the target group.
A third dimension is the level of ambition of environmental policies and the pressure this
gives to the target group. This is the core of Porters’ hypothesis: if the pressure is high
enough companies will utilise their innovative abilities to comply with environmental
standards (Porter, 1991; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Against the current trend of a
retreating government this calls for environmental policy with ambitious goals as being
indispensable to spur a further greening of industry. In reaction to critics Porter and van der
Linde (1995) acknowledge that regulatory pressure alone is not enough for the effective
stimulation of environmental innovations. They also point out elements as the time path
(the next, fourth, dimension), freedom of choice, and reduction of uncertainty.
The fourth dimension is the time horizon. Especially more fundamental innovation take a
relatively long time to develop, often more than is available through legislative measures.
This can lead to suboptimal outcomes: target groups look for ready solutions to their
problems due to short-term legal requirements while technological developments may
foster superior solutions in the longer term. Here the element of uncertainty also comes into
play: in order to work out innovative solution for environmental problems target groups
need sufficient time but also certainty about legal standards.
The fifth dimension involves the instrumentation of policy: (a) type of stimulus or
steering strategy: economic/financial, legal, social/communicative/informational; (b)
enlarging or restrictive with respect to behavioural options for the addressees; (c) options
for accountability and enforcement.
The sixth dimension involves the choice of addressees of policy, and the way these are
addressed. (1) While certain target groups can be targeted directly, as in the case of well-
organised industrial branches, some target groups are difficult to reach for policy makers. It
may be more effective, for example, to address the consumer target group indirectly
through producers or retailers than by addressing them directly. (2) It is possible to
differentiate within a target group. For policies directed toward a specific industrial branch
it can be necessary to treat frontrunners and laggard different as compared to the majority
of companies. (3) In policies there has been increasing use of so-called network
approaches. Instead of bilateral relations between government and a specific target group
social configurations or networks in which the target group operates can be used or
9networks can be adjusted or created for the benefit of environmental policy. The network
approach has become more influential in for example Dutch environmental policies
directed at industries. Underlying policy theories now generally assume that adoption and
development of environment oriented innovations in companies take place in interaction
with various network partners of companies and is influenced by network characteristics of
its production and technology (Green et al, 1994; Kemp, 1994; Schot et al, 1994; Hart,
1995; Porter, 1998; Van Dijken et al, 1999). Recent strategies therefore not only focus on
individual companies but also on the networks in which these companies operate. In the
Netherlands, for example, the introduction of environmental management systems in
companies is stimulated through the deliberate use of so-called network steering (De Bruijn
and Lulofs, 1996). The use of voluntary agreements between branches and government
agencies since the beginning of the nineties also to a large extent depends on the role of the
branch associations, often a relevant actor in the network of companies.
With this paper we aim to assess the value-added of voluntary agreements as a new
approach to deal with environmental problems caused by industry. The main questions we
seek to answer are:
• Do voluntary branch agreements lead to significant change in environmental behaviour
of the target groups?
• Are changes in environmental behaviour of the target group related to the voluntary
agreement or related to a complex of environmental policies directed at the target
group?
3. Voluntary agreements as a new policy system
This section is on innovation in Dutch environmental policy making, and in particular the
role of voluntary agreements. Voluntary agreements - also called negotiated agreements,
environmental agreements, or covenants  are agreements between government and
industrial branche associations or individual firms concerning particular environmental
impacts (c.f. EEA, 1997). In this paper we focus on a particular category, the
comprehensive covenants for specific branches of industry that came about from 1993 on
as part of the new ‘target group approach’ established within the first National
Environmental Policy Plan (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1989). However, the
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innovativeness of this new approach also relates to the way in which the voluntary
agreement is related to other policy instruments. Thus, voluntary agreements are not merely
replacing existing policy instruments but complementing them. Voluntary agreements are
the most typical kind of policy instrument for the Dutch policy approach that draws on
consensus and self-regulation. Voluntary agreements are formal agreements between
government and representatives of societal sectors - usually branches of industry - in which
the latter assume certain commitments often as an alternative to direct regulation. Most
voluntary agreements concern environmental issues, implying that the commitments, when
lived up to, should be beneficial to the environment.
The voluntary agreements as part of the target group approach of industry are framed in a
six-step scheme with regular evaluation of progress of the agreement (generally every four
years).
1. First, emission reduction targets have been formulated for the industry as a whole based
on the national environmental policy plans (NEPP 1 and 2: Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal, 1989; 1993) and other policy plans concerning central issues of sustainable
development, such as water management and energy saving.
2. Next, 15 priority branches of industry, involving 12.000 companies responsible for over
90% of industry based environmental pollution, have been selected by the Ministry of
the Environment.
3. Negotiations were started with each of the 15 branches. The Ministry of the
Environment and the trade associations have established the so-called ‘Integral
Environmental Targets’, mainly in terms of emission reductions, at the branch level.
Targets are set for 1995, 2000 en 2010 to a base year that varies dependent on available
(emission) data. For example, in the printing industry targets were set relative to the
base year 1990, as a detailed branch study provides data with regard to emissions for
that year4. The outcomes were recorded in voluntary agreements that were signed
officially by all parties. Large companies and representatives of the regulators
(provinces, municipalities, and waterboards) were also involved. Part of the deal was
that the branch would not be bothered by new legislative measures, but that the
                                                
4 This study was part of the initiative taken by KVGO (the printing industry branch association)
in 1988 to develop an environmental policy for the whole branch.
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environmental permits of participating companies would be adjusted to the content of
the agreement.
4. An independent agency (with a considerable stake for the trade associations) was
established and charged with facilitating the implementation of the covenants, through
extensive information campaigns and support for individual firms.
5. For the implementation of the voluntary agreements, a distinction has been made
between homogenous and heterogeneous branches (based on differences in firm size and
production processes). In the former case, an ‘Environmental Handbook or Manual’ was
developed, which served as a uniform directive for each participating company. In the
later case, each participating company had to develop an individual ‘Corporate
Environmental Plan’, that should be submitted for approval to the main regulator (either
the municipality or province). Corporate environmental plans will be renewed every
four years, and will be based on assessments of the state of the art for technologies in the
respective branches. New technologies which are accepted as applicable for the specific
sector are labelled as certain measures and need to be incorporated when corporate
environmental plans are renewed. In the case of the metal working and electrical
engineering industry, however, companies will develop corporate environmental plans
based on general directives (technological state of the art for different processes) laid
down in a guidebook.
6. The final step involved the implementation within the practise of corporate
environmental management and the adjustment of the firm’s environmental licences.
With respect to monitoring and control, participating companies have to submit annual
progress reports, according to a framework laid down in the voluntary agreements. (This
last issue is backed up by a new law on environmental reports, which will take force as
of 1999 and affect the 300 largest or most polluting companies.)
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Table 1:  Overview of target group voluntary agreements for branches of industry as of 1998
Industry Type Covenants
Basic metals industry Heterogeneous 1993
Chemical industry Heterogeneous 1993
Printing industry Homogenous 1993
Dairy industry Heterogeneous 1994
Metal working and electrical engineering industry Homogenous/
heterogeneous
1995
Textile industry Heterogeneous 1995
Paper industry Heterogeneous 1996
Concrete and cement industry Homogenous 1998
The process was subject to considerable delays. Only three voluntary agreements were in
place on schedule (i.e. ultimo 1993). This concerned the chemical industry, the basic
metals industry, and the printing industry. These were also the most important ones, as
these industries covered 60% of the total industrial environmental impact. In two cases the
negotiations were not finished (as of  August 1996) and in six cases the parties involved
agreed to refrain from a covenant after all. Table one provides an overview of voluntary
agreements between government and industry as of 1998.
3.1 Diffusion and innovation potential of voluntary agreements
Figure 1 provides an overview of the mechanisms for diffusion and innovation. These
mechanisms partly depend on the linkages of the voluntary agreements to other
instruments, such as technology programs and direct regulation (the permitting system),
hence the term policy system.
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Figure 1 The cycle of diffusion and innovation in the new policy system
Part of the potential for diffusion and innovation of voluntary agreements is derived from
the relationship of voluntary agreements to technology policy and to direct regulation. The
crux of the voluntary agreement is that individual companies are obliged to grade their
production up to the state of the art (what is reasonably achievable) for their respective
production processes. Especially branch associations play an important role in delivering
this message and the information regarding what is achievable to their members.
Furthermore, those companies not bound by the agreement and not willing to comply with
its terms, still have to meet the same standards, as the ‘state of the art’ has a legal
foundation in the comprehensive Environmental Management Act in the Netherlands.
Through this principle, permit givers are legally bound to prescribe measures to companies
on the basis of what is reasonably achievable. As this is laid down in the workbook or
technical assessments of the branch in the process of the voluntary agreement, they need to
adapt requirements to this. Thus the mechanism of diffusion, which is set in motion by the
voluntary agreement, the workbooks and certain measures of the branch association, is
being fuelled by the inspectors in the process of giving and renewing permits.
The innovation potential of the voluntary agreements is related to two mechanisms. First of
Technology  Programs
Voluntary Agreements
Permitting System
Assessment of technological
bottlenecks for reaching targets,
programs to develop technologies
related to bottlenecks
Environmental inspectors approve
corporate environmental plans for the
voluntary agreements
New technologies applicable for
branches are evaluated for acceptance
as state of the art and, if accepted, are
laid down in the workbook or become
certain  measures
State of the art of technology is laid
down in workbook and prescribed in
environmental permit
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all, the targets set in the respective branches can generally not be met by mere diffusion of
the state of the art throughout branches, there are certain bottlenecks for which new or
improved technologies need to be developed5. These bottlenecks are assessed through
detailed branch studies within the agreement and take the function as setting directions for
technology development. Thus, related to these covenants, in a specific technology
program funded by the Dutch ministry of environment technologies are stimulated which
have the potential of solving some of the bottlenecks for reaching the targets in the specific
branches. In exchange for the willingness of specific branches to commit to specific targets
set in the agreements, the government is prepared to support branches in the development
of environment-oriented technologies. The technology program is an indication for the
branch and related technology developers which problems need to be solved in the medium
and long term. Moreover, when new technologies are developed and have proven to be
applicable to the specific branch through a number of stages, they will eventually be laid
down in the workbooks or become labelled as certain measures. This implies that this
mechanism ensures that a process of continuous improvement is taking place, until targets
set in the voluntary agreement are reached.
In conclusion, the set up of the voluntary agreements and the linkages to other instruments
suggest that within the system mechanisms for continuous improvement are in place. This
is based on the assumption that technological change is necessary in order to reach the
goals set in the voluntary agreements. Apart from autonomous developments in companies
and technology developers, technology programs also play a role in informing relevant
parties about technological bottlenecks and by providing funds to those willing and capable
to develop technologies which can overcome these bottlenecks. The technological changes
can trickle down to individual companies through two stages. First, the new technology
needs to become accepted as state of the art, and if so, will then be incorporated in the
                                                
5 There is some discussion whether this holds for all branches which have engaged in voluntary
agreements. Representatives from environmental NGO’s argue that the chemical industry will
be able to reach the targets without development and implementation of new technologies. But
agreements for metal plating and printing industry are said to be more technology forcing if
targets are to be met, especially for reduction of emissions of heavy metals to water and VOCs
to air respectively. For the basic metal industry an analysis of technical and economic
bottlenecks revealed that remaining bottlenecks to reach targets for 2000 where predominantly
of an economic nature and related to SO2 and NOx emissions.
15
workbook for the specific branch. In the second place, environmental inspectors will use
the workbook as their point of reference for framing requirements in the environmental
permit. In terms of instrumentation this implies that the policy system both employs
steering strategies of a financial, legal and social nature.
4. The effectiveness of voluntary agreements: results from Dutch
evaluations
In this section we will review the effectiveness of the voluntary agreements, notably the
special target group covenants. Most of the literature containing some kind of assessment is
focused on two covenants, those for the chemical industry and the basic metals.
Assessment of this kind can be made in two ways. First, the environmental improvements,
an assessment against the reference situation, the emission levels in a specific year. Second,
the effectiveness of the voluntary agreement, an assessment against historical trends, the
virtual situation without the voluntary agreement (EEA, 1997).
Government and industry are clearly very pleased with the results thus far. There is no
doubt that things have changed and relations between government and industry have
improved. There is no doubt either that industry is active with environmental management
and the public advertising of their achievements in this field. The environmental
movement, however, has strong doubts whether companies, in particular the large ones, are
not merely doing what they would have done under the old regulatory regime, especially
since evaluations show that the quality and profoundness of the CEP’s are falling short.
The basic metals industry is well on course for eight out of 28 targets set for 2000 for
specific substances, while additional efforts are needed for ten substances.  For ten other
substances data are insufficient for a reliable assessment (according to an evaluation study
of CEP's in the basic metals by the Dutch NGO, Stichting Natuur en Milieu: Biekart,
1994). Overall around 80% of planned total emission reductions are realised by 2000. In
comparison to what the traditional regulatory regime was expected to have achieved,
emissions to air are assumed to be reduced more strongly under the voluntary agreements
than under command and control, while discharge to water was somewhat higher than
expected (Glasbergen, 1998: 151).
The chemical industry is also well on course for meeting the targets set for 1995 and 2000.
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Emission reductions for 33 of 61 pollutants included in the covenant, are above the level
that might have been expected, but it is not clear to what extent this is due to the voluntary
agreement (which is one of six case studies from EU-member states in an evaluation report
on voluntary agreements by the EEA, 1997). The reason the chemical industry is doing
relatively better than the basic metals industry may be related to differences in economic
prosperity (Glasbergen, 1998).
Next, we go a little more into detail concerning some of the dimensions of a flexible
approach as an alternative to command and control.
Freedom of choice
The general assumption is that voluntary agreements provide more freedom of choice or
flexibility to companies which holds opportunities to improve cost effectiveness, for
instance by fitting in environmental improvements with their investment schemes. In the
case of the target group covenants this can be done by adapting the prioritisation of
environmental measures taken by companies in the course to 2010. Other contributions to
more flexibility and cost-effectiveness are improved co-operation between licensing
authorities and less complex procedures. In the case of the chemical industry all parties
assume that these improvements in cost-effectiveness have been realised, but there is no
hard evidence (EEA, 1997).
The short-term goals for each four year cycle are based on the ‘alara-principle’. Basically
this means that (emission reduction) targets are prescribed in stead of means, as was the
case in the command and control approach. Companies can achieve these targets by using
‘best available technology’ but are free to choose any other means that leads to the same
outcome. It is clear that the number of alternative options will be very limited in most
cases.
In homogeneous branches, mainly consisting of SME’s with similar production processes
such as the printing industry, the implementation of the voluntary agreement is through a
uniform workbook that applies to all companies, containing basic standards and rules. This
is in fact a system of rather detailed prescription of environmental measures to be taken by
each company that leaves little freedom of choice. In some cases, companies prefer strict
prescriptions and the security of exactly knowing what to do to meet the regulatory demand
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over the burden of finding the most efficient way to meet environmental targets and the
duty of registration and reporting to the authorities.
Consensus and communication
In principle, voluntary agreements are well suited to relieve uncertainty about regulatory
demands. In the target group framework a comprehensive scheme of target setting is
established. In the first step targets at the branch level for the short (1995), mid (2000), and
long term (2010) were set based on the overall targets in the NEPP. Next, each individual
company draws its own Corporate Environmental Plan which includes targets and
measures at the company level for the next four years, and a preview for the second cycle.
When the permit issuing authorities approve the CEP, the permits will be adjusted to the
CEP and the company is preserved from additional demands.
In previous generations of voluntary agreements there was more insecurity as to the extent
to which the parties involved were committed to the terms of the agreement. First, the legal
status often was unclear. Where they contracts under private law, or not? Second, the
content of the arrangement was not exact, more often formulated in terms of efforts than
results. Enforcement of these agreements was difficult (e.g. Algemene Rekenkamer, 1995).
A specific problem was the relationship to the environmental permits. Previously,
individual firms and permit issuing authorities - municipalities, provinces, and
waterboards - were formally no party to the agreements closed between national
government and branch associations. Jurisdiction indicates that such voluntary agreements
cannot overrule the competencies of the individual permit issuing authority (Glasbergen,
1998). During the drafting of the covenant, the basic metals industry had expressed its
concerns about the linkage of the environmental permits to the covenants. The special
committee (Commissie Kortman6) to which the issue was submitted, found that amending
the environmental management Act was superfluous, as this could not bind the permit
issuing authorities. It recommended that all interested parties - individual companies and
                                                
6 Commissie voor de toetsing van wetgevingsprojecten (1993) Convenanten en
vergunningverlening: advies van de Commissie voor de toetsing van wetgevingsprojecten.
Den Haag.
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local authorities – would be invited to back up the agreement as signatories. This has
become common practise with most of the target group covenant and provides a specific
level of certainty to the companies involved.
Still, much uncertainty remains for all parties:
• The guiding principle of ‘best available technology’ is very difficult to apply in specific
cases. Often authorities are not able to operationalize these standards and apply them on
individual firms. In branches where workbooks are applied, companies complain about
the periodical re-assessments of the BAT-standards and the uncertainty stemming from
this.
• Indistinct data on the levels of emissions for the branch in the reference year make it hard
to assess the results in terms of percentages of emissions reduction.
• The clause that makes commitments for the short term results dependent on the
economic prosperity of the branch and that opens the opportunity to rearrange priorities
at the company level on the route to the achievement of the finals targets for 2010,
increases the uncertainty about the commitments for the companies, while the grounds
for application of the clause are hard to judge for the authorities.
• Monitoring and control by permit issuing authorities is very demanding, the agencies
concerned are often lacking adequate expertise and manpower. According to Biekart
(1994) lack of technical expertise may be overcome through support from the
independent agency for the implementation of the covenants, while the real problem
concerns social skills for effective co-operation with other governmental agencies and
bargaining with companies.
• Now the target group approach has lead to improvements in the relationships between
government and industry on environmental issues, control and enforcement by permit
issuing authorities are usually not very strict, as they are careful not to disrupt the good
atmosphere. Evaluations mention frequent violations of deadlines, notably for the
submission of the CEP's, and the annual reports. Sluggish firms are always treated very
considerately.
• Formally, firms that refuse to join the target group scheme must be treated very strictly.
Their permits must be reviewed and the same standards as agreed in the covenant must
be imposed on them by means of a permit with traditional prescriptions. Although
certain firms have refused, there are no known cases of aggravation of prescriptions in
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environmental permits as a result of it.
Level of ambition of environmental policy
It is not easy to assess the level of ambition of the target group approach. The final targets
in the NEPP are ambitious, emission reductions of 70%-90% in 2010, but there are many
escapes in the way they are transformed into targets and commitments for individual
companies. The basic idea of setting ambitious targets and imposing them on industry is
compatible with the core idea of Porter's hypothesis, and the flexible approach chosen in
stead of command and control is also according to the latest views. However, approaches
based on best available techniques are often criticised for impeding innovation (a.o.: Porter
en Van der Linde, 1995), also when part of voluntary agreement schemes (a.o.: Jenkins,
1995). This applies in particular to countries as the Netherlands, that are among the
frontrunners with respect to the greening of industry. The extent to which the target group
scheme holds incentives for further innovation needed to realise the final targets for 2010 is
dealt with elsewhere in this paper.
Here we briefly comment on a very recent case of a voluntary agreement based on similar
principles. In the Dutch climate change policy and the implementation of the Kyoto
protocol, an important role is given to the so-called ‘benchmark covenant’.7 In this
agreement between the national government and the most energy intensive sectors of
industry, the latter commit themselves to be among the world-wide frontrunners in the field
of energy efficiency in 2012. In exchange government will preserve them from further legal
demands concerning emissions of greenhouse gasses. Critics state, that although it is
obvious that the Kyoto-targets will not be achieved with the present state-of-the-art
technology, this covenant will slow down the rate of innovation. This means that the
burden for meeting the overall targets is shifted to other industrial sectors and consumers,
which will lead for instance to higher ecotaxes (Van de Wiel, 1999). Former minister of the
environment, Winsemius, claims that it is almost impossible for the Dutch government and
its agencies to assess criteria for frontrunners in energy efficiency and the extent to which
                                                
7 The relevant policy document is de Uitvoeringsnota Klimaatbeleid of 23 June 1999 (Tweede
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1999). See also: www.minvrom.nl.
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the Dutch industry meets these criteria.8
Choice of policy instruments
Voluntary agreements are hard to classify as a type of policy instruments. The standard
classification of economic, juridical, and social/communicative instruments is not
unequivocal in this respect. Previous voluntary agreements were in fact mainly policy
instruments for social or communicative steering, aimed at building a relationship of
mutual trust. The possibilities for including legal commitments and to enforce compliance,
possibly in court, were limited. The target group covenants are less separate means. This
offers the opportunity for establishing more extended legal commitments, because they are
better integrated into the environmental policy system, including permitting.
Nevertheless, the whole system of target group approach and covenants involves incentives
of a social or communicative nature. First there is the issue of internalisation, the
cornerstone of the target group approach, which means an active engagement of sectors of
society, such as industry, in solving the environmental problems, acceptation of the
responsibility for their share in the problems and integration of the policy targets in their
own business targets. Branch associations have an important role in provision of
information and stimulating co-operation between companies. Also, the public image of
companies is at stake. In principle, an uncooperative attitude may harm the company’s
public image. Especially large and well-known companies may be susceptible for this.
However, there is no evidence that this factor is of much importance.
Voluntary agreements are not really economic or market-based instruments, but still there
are clearly economic benefits in it: ‘quid pro quo’. Formally companies agree to higher
efforts in environmental measures. In exchange they receive reduction of uncertainty
through fixed demands (at least intended), more leeway to match environmental
improvements with the company's own (economic) interests, and reduction of the
administrative burden (simplified and more flexible licensing process).
                                                
8 Interview with P. Winsemius in: Schrama & Van Lierop (in press).
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4.1 The innovation potential of voluntary agreements
This section explores whether voluntary agreements induce technological change. We use
data from an evaluation of a technology program set up by the Dutch ministry of
Environment9 to reduce technological bottlenecks for reaching environmental targets in
industry (Arentsen en Hofman, 1996). We have analysed a total of 146 projects for the
period 1993-1995 and investigated the motives for the start up of these projects10. Table 2
summarises the outcomes.
Table 2 Motives for projects within the Program Environmental Technology,
1993-1995 (Source: Arentsen & Hofman, 1996: appendix 3.2)
Program Environmental Technology Number of  projects
Total Number of  projects 146 (100%)
Motives for Projects (more than one answer possible)
Anticipation of  legislation 67 (46%)
Problem of applicant 45 (31%)
Need for technology 76 (52%)
Other motives 29 (20%)
Anticipation of Legislation Motives further classified (total 67 projects)
Environmental Act (13 projects)
Surface Water Pollution Act (10)
Covenant VOC 2 000 /Packaging covenant (8)
Voluntary Agreements of Industrial Branches (10)
Waste/Water Policies (11)
Other (15)
For 67 projects out of a total of 146 anticipation of legislation was one of the motives to
start up the project. In 10 cases there was specific reference to the voluntary agreement
between an industrial branch and the government, eight other cases referred to the
packaging covenant or VOC 2000 covenant. Within the total of 146 projects, 27 projects
                                                
9 Novem is the executive agency for this technology program.
10 This was done by an analysis of the project proposals submitted by the companies to the program
committee.
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took place within industrial branches for which voluntary agreements were concluded in
the period 1993-1995, namely the printing industry (agreement in 1993), dairy industry
(1994) and textiles industry (1995). For five of the 27 projects applicants referred to the
voluntary agreement, while in the printing industry there was an additional reference for
five projects to the VOC covenant11 which preceded the voluntary branch agreement in the
printing industry. Overall, this indicates that voluntary agreements have some but limited
influence on innovations in companies of the target group.
To obtain a clearer indication for the influence of the voluntary agreement we conducted
telephone interviews with 14 companies in three branches with voluntary agreements: the
printing industry, dairy industry, and metal working and electrical engineering. These
companies participated in the same technology program in the period 1995-1998.
Furthermore, additional interviews were carried out with six experts from the specific
branches and the technology program. Respondents were asked what the influence of the
voluntary agreements was on innovation12 on a scale from zero (no influence) to ten (strong
influence). Table 3 summarises the outcomes.
Table 3 Influence of voluntary agreements on innovative behaviour13, according to
respondents on a scale from 0 (no influence) to 10 (high influence)
Branch Companies Experts
Average 2 7
Printing industry 1 8
Dairy industry 1 -
Metal industry 4 7
To summarise, it can be concluded that the influence of the voluntary agreements on
innovations for the respective branches can not be clearly assessed. Outcomes of research
                                                
11 This covenant covers the emissions of volatile organic compounds to the air, and is enacted to
reduce harm to the ozone layer.
12 For companies, the influence on the specific technology projects, for experts the general
assumed influence of the voluntary agreements on innovative behaviour in companies.
13 We thank Gerald Jan Ellen for carrying out these interviews.
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give mixed pictures. However, there are indications that individual companies who apply
innovations tend to underestimate the influence of voluntary agreements on innovations as
compared to actors active in the network of companies of specific branches. These experts
generally acknowledge that voluntary agreements tend to set some degree of direction for
what kind of innovation is expected from, or necessary in, specific branches.
We also pointed out that apart from the stimulation of new technologies, an important
mechanism in the voluntary agreement is the fact that newly developed technologies
become state of the art for respective branches. Due to the longer term associated with the
development and implementation of new technologies, we only have limited data here. For
the voluntary agreement of the printing industry, which is longest in operation, we can
provide some information. Table 4 provides information regarding technology projects
funded by the Dutch Ministry of the Environment and the linkage to the workbook of the
printing industry.
Table 4  Linkage of developed technologies in technology program to the workbook of
the printing industry (Source: Memo by VNG to NOVEM, interview with program director NOVEM)
Total projects/technologies 19
Already entered in workbook 2
To be entered in workbook 4
Possibly in the near term to be entered in workbook
(additional research needed)
9
Not to be entered in workbook 3
This gives evidence for the earlier described mechanism through which the state of the art
in the respective branches continuously changes. Adoption of new developed technologies
that are environmentally superior to predecessors in the workbook of the printing industry
is taking place. The workbook provides the basis for the requirements under the permitting
system implying that companies need to adapt their performance according to the changed
state of the art. In this sense this mechanism has the potential of inducing the continuous
improvement necessary to reach the targets set in the voluntary agreement. An assessment
of the kind of innovation which has been realised however shows that most are of an
incremental nature, and do not lead to radical change in the printing industry. The most
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radical innovation in the set of 19 technologies in table 4, digital printing, was not accepted
for the workbook because it threatens more conventional methods of printing. This is also
indicative for the change that can be realised through voluntary agreements. In the
agreements the current existing and powerful companies (and used production
technologies) are of course strongly represented. Newcomers, or new technologies that may
be developed outside the branch, are not part of the voluntary agreement. This implies that
the consensual and target group approach will generally not be conducive to innovation of a
more radical kind. The same goes for more chain related changes that often need to involve
consumers or companies in the chain but outside the specific branch. As these are not
involved in the voluntary agreement the development of new production and consumption
systems may be well beyond the scope of the actors involved in the voluntary agreements.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have looked at the potential for diffusion and innovation of more flexible
environmental policy approaches as compared to traditional command and control. The
differences between the traditional and more flexible policy approaches are summarised in
table 5.
Table 5 Differences between traditional and flexible approach along six dimensions
Dimension Command and Control Voluntary agreements within policy
system
Degree of freedom of choice Low High
Co-operative nature Low High
Level of ambition Variable Variable
Time horizon Short term Medium  to long term
Instrumentation Legal / restrictive / enforceable Financial&legal&social / direction
setting / more difficult to enforce
Addressees of policy Generally individual companies
/ direct approach
Target groups / network approach
One of the most striking differences between the two approaches concerns the way the
approach is set up. The new approach is of a more comprehensive nature, in the sense that
it builds on legal, financial and social instruments for policy making. Furthermore, where
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useful, target groups are approached indirectly through intermediates such as branch
associations. However, generally speaking enforcement has become more complicated. It is
less clear what actually needs to be enforced, while in the case of a non-co-operative target
group (after signature) it will be difficult to enforce change without returning to a
command and control type of approach. In some cases companies have threatened to curb
production in the Netherlands if certain energy targets are enforced strictly.
The target group itself also receives the new approach differently. It has more leeway to
develop and plan its environmental strategies, and in the process it can keep lines open
with government agencies to negotiate targets and implementation. However if the target
group does not feel enough pressure it is likely also to fall short of developing more radical
innovations, more so if there are not economic advantages associated with this.
Table 6 summarises some of the results of the voluntary agreements along the six
dimensions. Furthermore, we give an assessment of the potential of the new approach for
delivering the kind of change that is needed for sustainable development. The success of
the voluntary agreement correlates positively with the degree of organisation of the target
group. This implies that in situations where the target group is very differentiated and not
well organised, it will be much more difficult to make progress through the negotiation of
voluntary agreements. Within the agreement the target group can time the development and
implementation of measures, however it is still unclear whether this will result in more
radical changes in the longer term. Also the consensual nature of voluntary agreements and
the network of actors currently involved in the agreements promote innovations of an
incremental nature rather than radical innovations because newcomers, or new technologies
which might be developed outside the branch, are not part of the voluntary agreement.
More research is needed whether the consensual and target group approach is less
conducive to innovation of  a more radical kind.
The diffusion of the state of the art of technology as propagated in voluntary agreements
will only be successful if it is complemented by direct regulation, this implies that when
direct regulation fails, voluntary agreements are also likely to fail.  The development of
‘new’ technologies will depend on whether voluntary agreements are complemented by
programs which specifically inform the target group about, and focus on, (technological
paths and) technologies which need to be developed in order to solve technological
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bottlenecks.
For sustainable development the linkage between production and consumption, and within
chains, is crucial and needs to be reconsidered. However this is well beyond the scope of
the current voluntary agreements and in this sense a new generation of voluntary
agreements which captures these dimensions will possible have more potential to facilitate
progress of industries towards sustainable development.
Table 6 Results of voluntary agreements and possible contribution to sustainable
development along six dimensions
Dimension Results Possible contribution to sustainable
development
Degree of freedom of
choice
Target groups can time own
implementation of measures to some
extent, however alara is bottom line for
individual companies
It is not clear who is taken the initiative to
develop new technologies, expected
market is still the main factor for inducing
innovation. Some choices for new
technologies and especially products do
not bring sustainable development closer
Co-operative nature Intensive negotiations between target
groups and government; regular
meetings improves acceptance and
basis for environmental policy making
Consultation takes place between existing
companies with significant interests in
current modes of production and which
may impede more radical innovations
Level of ambition Long term targets (2010) are ambitious;
short term targets (1995) reflect state-
of-the-art technology and tend to
‘business as usual’
Depends on the realisation of necessary
innovations. Targets or now mainly
emission targets and less focussed on
input/resource use, whereas this is a
condition to progress towards sustainable
development
Time horizon Extension of the time horizon,
especially for the mid (2000) and long
term goals (2010) gives direction and
some certainty for industries
Depends on effectiveness of the links with
technology policy; long term is needed to
develop new technologies and product-
consumption linkages
Instrumentation Mix of instruments works to some
extent, most target groups are on
schedule for most targets; but difficulty
is how to change to strict enforcement
in time when targets are not within
reach
Mix of instruments needs to give enough
pressure and scope to drive and facilitate
industries on a path to sustainable
development, co-ordination between
various policies in different policy areas is
needed
Addressees of policy Associations and active companies are
being reached, more difficult to reach
laggard/defensive companies. Success
of network approach depends on degree
of organisation of target group
Much of the goals of sustainable
development need collaboration between
various actors. Relation to consumption
and other industrial sectors is limited,
while much of the progress might come
from changes in these linkages or
technological development outside the
branch
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